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HANDS OFF THE GUN!
A CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES V. JAMESON





When Ben Cecala went to his brother's funeral, he did not have a
gun.' After the funeral, he asked a friend to take him to the cemetery,
but just minutes after the group left the funeral, United States Marshals
stopped the car and found a gun right where Ben's feet would have
2been. Because he was a convicted felon, Ben could not legally have a
gun, and he was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of
a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
3
The decision about how to defend the case was undoubtedly agoniz-
ing.4 The penalty for illegally possessing a firearm was up to ten years in
prison. However, witnesses from the funeral said that Ben could not
have had a gun on him during that time.6 The only evidence to link him
to the gun was the fact that it was at his feet when the car was stopped
t Attorney, Utah Federal Defender Office, and Special Counsel, United States Sentencing
Commission; Law Clerk to the Honorable Timothy M. Tymkovich, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
2005-2006; Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul G. Cassell, United States District Court for the District
of Utah, 2003-2004; J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, 2003. This
work was undertaken while the author was Special Counsel at the United States Sentencing Com-
mission. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
any policies or positions of the United States Sentencing Commission. I appreciate the thoughtful
feedback I received from Jeff Hurd, Erik Luna, Stew Young, Karyn Kenny, and Kent Hart and the
constant support and encouragement of my wife, Suzette.
I. Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Cecala, No. 2:06-CR-00733
(D. Utah Mar. 16, 2007). Cecala was ably represented by Kristen Angelos of the Utah Federal
Defender Office, where I am currently employed as an attorney. I did not participate in Cecala's
case and was not privy to any confidential information. The discussion of this case is based only on
pleadings that are a matter of public record.
2. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Cecala, No. 2:06-CR-
00733 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2007).
3. Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty at 1, United States v. Cecala, No.
2:06-CR-00733 (D. Utah Jan. 18, 2007).
4. Given the factual complexities and nuances of constructive possession cases, one scholar
suggests that attorneys should use a mathematical theorem to predict whether a particular defendant
should plead guilty or go to trial based on the probability of prevailing at trial on a constructive
possession case. David Caudill, Probability Theory and Constructive Possession of Narcotics: On
Finding that Winning Combination, 17 HOuS. L. REV. 541, 543 (1980) (arguing that Baye's Theory
provides a method for calculating a defendant's chances of winning a constructive possession case).
Under the Tenth Circuit's case law, Cecala's chances of winning would be close to zero.
5. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (2008).
6. Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 1, at Exhibit 1 (investigator notes of
Amy Borgholthaus interview).
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and the arresting officer's testimony that Ben made "furtive movements,"
his head "bobbing up and down," and looked like he was "playing with
something in his hands.",7 According to the officer, he "looked like he
may have placed something on the floor of the car."8 A fingerprint ex-
amination of the gun turned up a usable print, but this print did not match
up with anyone in the fingerprint database. 9 This fact meant the finger-
print could not have been Ben's-as a convicted felon, his prints were in
the system and would have shown up as a match.10 No witness could put
the gun in his hand at any point in the past or suggest that Ben ever in-
tended to pick it up at any point in the future.
Still, Ben decided to plead guilty. His plea agreement stated coldly:
On September 22, 2006, in Tooele, Utah, the car in which I was a
passenger was stopped. Officers conducted a search and found a
handgun-a Lorcin .380 pistol-and a loaded clip of ammunition on
the floor of the car, where my feet had been. I knowingly possessed
the firearm because I knew it was on the floor near my feet and I had
access to it. Thus, according to the law, I constructively possessed
it.1
Based on this admission, Ben was sentenced to four years in prison.
12
Crimes such as § 922(g), of course, aim to keep weapons out of the
hands of people who are likely to use them to do harm.13  In some cases,
prosecutors seek to punish individuals for possessing contraband not
actually within their immediate, physical control but within the broader
sphere over which they assert "dominion and control."' 4  Known as
"constructive" or "legal" possession, this judicially created doctrine has
long been a useful tool for prosecutors to prosecute "cases where actual
7. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id.
11. Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, supra note 3, at 4.
12. The actual sentence was for 46 months. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v.
Cecala, No. 2:06-CR-00733 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2007).
13. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) ("The legislative history of the gun control
laws discloses Congress' worry about the easy availability of firearms, especially to those persons
who pose a threat to community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus between violent crime
and the possession of a firearm by any person with a criminal record.") (citing 114 CONG. REC.
13220 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings)); id. at 16298 (remarks of Rep. Pollock); United States v.
Jester, 139 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66) (stating that Congress
enacted § 922(g)(1) "in order to keep firearms out of the hands of those persons whose prior conduct
indicated a heightened proclivity or using firearms to threaten community peace and the 'continued
operation of the Government of the United States"').
14. The terms "dominion and control" have been subject to some criticism because they are
"simply not informative in any functional manner." Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens,
Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751, 759
(1972). However, "every jurisdiction that uses constructive possession defines it in [these] terms."
id. at 759 n.26; see also SEVENTH CIRCUIT FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 323 (1999),
available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pjury.pdf (substituting the word "direction" for the word
"dominion").
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possession at the time of arrest can not be shown, but where the inference
that there has been possession at one time is exceedingly strong."'
' 5
But what about cases like Ben's, where the defendant never has and
never will lay a hand on the gun? In recent years the Tenth Circuit has
expanded the doctrine of constructive possession such that any time a
person "has knowledge of and access to" some contraband, he is guilty
of possessing that item.' 6 This past term, in United States v. Jameson,
17
the court reaffirmed its expanded view of the doctrine and held that the
government properly established a link between a car passenger and a
gun at his feet where the passenger made "furtive movements" and
where the gun would have been in plain view but for the fact that the
passenger's feet were there.1
8
In expanding the doctrine of constructive possession as it has done,
the Tenth Circuit is unique among all other circuits. Ten other circuits
have defined constructive possession so as to require proof that the de-
fendant had not only the knowledge of and power to possess the gun (i.e.,
access to it), but also the intention to do so.19 It is time for the Tenth
Circuit to recognize that its common law definition of constructive pos-
session has unfairly broadened the scope of criminal liability and to rec-
tify that injustice by requiring evidence of intention to exercise dominion
and control in constructive possession cases.
Part I begins with Jameson and studies the expansion of this doc-
trine in the Tenth Circuit. Part II discusses two major flaws with this
development that make the doctrine overbroad and inconsistent with
every other circuit. Part III discusses a number of policy considerations
15. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 755 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Markus
Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 829, 938 (2001) ("[The courts invented the concept of constructive possession.").
16. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v.
Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 713 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th
Cir. 2004). For the proposition that the doctrine of constructive possession is a judicially created
doctrine, see Whitebread, supra note 14, at 751 ("Attempting to rationalize the imposition of crimi-
nal liability in situations where there is no actual possession, the courts have constructed a terminol-
ogy purportedly designed to focus factual inquiries on factors likely to reveal whether the defendant
had the ability or capacity to possess the item."); see also Mark Rabinowitz, Criminal Law Con-
structive Possession: Must the Commonwealth Still Prove Intent?-Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 60
TEMP. L.Q. 445, 449 (1986) (stating that the doctrine of constructive possession was judicially
created).
17. 478 F.3d 1204. Christopher Jameson was ably represented at trial by Lynn Donaldson
and on appeal by Kent Hart, both of the Utah Federal Defender Office. I did not participate in repre-
sentation in either forum and was not privy to any confidential information. The discussion of his
case here is based only on the published Tenth Circuit opinion.
18. Id. at 1210.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Ci. 2007); United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir.
2007); United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. McFarlane, 491
F.3d 53, 59 (lst Cir. 2007); United States v. Piwowar, 492 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (1 1th Cit. 2006); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 222
(2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Scott, 424 F.3d 431,435-36 (4th Cir. 2005).
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why the court should limit, rather than expand, this doctrine. Part IV
offers specific recommendations that would apply this doctrine more
fairly.
I. TENTH CIRCUIT EXPANSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION
A. Background ofUnited States v. Jameson
Like Cecala, United States v. Jameson20 involved a gun found at the
feet of a felon hitching a ride in someone else's car.2 ' Jameson began
with an early morning traffic stop for a taillight that was not working.2
When he pulled the car over, the officer who initiated the stop saw four
occupants in the car.23 A male occupant in the front passenger seat
leaned forward and appeared to rummage through the glove compart-
ment.24 Another male in the back seat on the passenger side "dropp[ed]
his shoulder and lean[ed] forward, as if he were retrieving or concealing
something on the floor.,
25
Based on these movements, the officer was concerned that the pas-
sengers were hiding drugs or that they could be armed. The officer
shined his flashlight into the car but saw only food and other debris on
the floor. 26 He then asked the female driving the car for her driver's li-
cense, registration, and insurance card.27 Because her license was sus-
pended, the officer said he would impound the car unless one of the other
passengers could legally drive.28 None of them were licensed, and when
asked their names, it turned out that two of the passengers had out-
standing warrants for their arrest.
29
The third passenger was Defendant Christopher Jameson. He was
the one in the back seat whom the officer had seen drop his shoulder and
lean forward. 30 He initially told officers his name was Adam Gibbons
and provided a false birth date.3' When information from police dispatch
refuted this claim, Jameson told officers his name was Christopher Gib-
bons, but this was also refuted, and Jameson was placed under arrest.
32
20. 478 F.3d 1204.
21. Id. at 1207.




26. Id. at 1206-07.
27. Id. at 1207.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1206.
31. Id. at 1207.
32. Id.
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An officer then inventoried the car's contents and discovered a
World War II-era bayonet sitting on the back seat.33 When the officer
reached into the car to get the bayonet, "he noticed a small, unloaded .22
caliber pistol ... on the floor in front of where Mr. Jameson had been
sitting.... exactly where Mr. Jameson's feet would have been before he
exited the car." 34 No fingerprints were found on the gun. Based on these
facts, Jameson, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was
charged with illegally possessing the pistol in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).35 At trial, Jameson requested the following jury instruction:
The law recognizes two types of possession: actual possession and
constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical
control over an object or thing, at a given time, is then in actual pos-
session of it.
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both
the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and
control over an object, either directly or through another person or
persons, is then in constructive possession of it.
More than one person can be in possession of an object if each knows
of its presence and has the power and intention to control it.
A defendant has joint possession of an object when two or more per-
sons share actual or constructive possession of it. However, merely
being present with others who have possession of the object does not
constitute possession.
In the situation where the object is found in a place (such as a room
or car) occupied by more than one person, you may not infer control
over the object based solely on joint occupancy. Mere control over
the place in which the object is found is not sufficient to establish
constructive possession. Instead, in this situation, the government
must provide some connection between the particular defendant and
the object.
In addition, momentary or transitory control of an object, without
criminal intent, is not possession. You should not find that the de-
fendant possessed the object if he possessed it only momentarily, and
either did not know that he possessed it or lacked criminal intent to
possess it.
36
While the court adopted much of this language, it replaced the second-to-




35. Id. at 1206.
36. Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions at 2-3, United States v. Jameson, No. 2:04-CR-
693-TS (D. Utah June 24, 2005).
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Where a defendant jointly occupies the place where the object is
found (such as a room or a car) constructive possession may be
shown by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence, which estab-
lishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge
that the firearm was contained in the place and the defendant had the
ability to access the firearm.
3 7
Based on the evidence described above and this jury instruction, the jury
voted to convict.
38
Jameson appealed, raising two claims related to constructive pos-
session.39 First, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to connect
him to the gun found on the floor of a car occupied by three other occu-
pants. 40  Second, he claimed that the jury instruction misled the jury be-
cause it failed to require proof of any connection between him and the
gun in joint possession cases.4'
B. General Principles
To understand the development of the doctrine in the Tenth Circuit,
it is necessary to understand how the doctrine of constructive possession
fits within the broader framework of federal criminal law. 42 Federal stat-
utes forbid certain types of people from possessing firearms.43  These
statutes do not define possession, so courts over the years have had to
define this term.44 The most obvious concept of possession is "actual
possession," which "exists when a person has direct physical control
37. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1208; Jury Instructions at 23, United States v. Jameson, No. 2:04-
CR-693-TS (D. Utah June 29, 2005).
38. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1206.
39. Jameson also raised a third claim related to a mistrial motion that is not within the scope
of this article.
40. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1206.
41. Id.
42. For a good overview of case law relating to constructive possession, see generally Kim-
berly J. Winbush, Annotation, What Constitutes "Constructive Possession" of Unregistered or
Otherwise Prohibited Weapon Under State Law, 88 A.L.R. 5th 121 (2001); Martin J. McMahon,
Annotation, Drug Abuse: What Constitutes Illegal Constructive Possession Under 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), Prohibiting Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Manufacture, Distrib-
ute, or Dispense the Same, 87 A.L.R. FED. 309 (1988).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (convicted felons), (2) (fugitive from justice), (3) (illicit drug
user), (4) (mentally defective), (5) (illegally present alien), (6) (dishonorably discharged veteran), (7)
(person who has renounced U.S. citizenship), (8) (person subject to a protective order), (9) (person
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence), (10) (juvenile) (2008). Other statutes
prohibit anyone from possessing certain types of weapons. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5861(b) (an
illegally transferred firearm), (c) (an illegally made firearm), (d) (an unregistered firearm), (h) (a
firearm with an obliterated serial number), (k) (an illegally imported firearm) (2008).
44. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 761 ("Constructive possession is a legal fiction used by
courts to find possession in situations where it does not in fact exist, but where they nevertheless
want an individual to acquire the legal status of a possessor" (emphasis added)). In contrast to the
federal definition, some state statutes explicitly define possession to clarify or expand what is essen-
tially the common law doctrine of constructive possession. Id at 759 n.26 (listing jurisdictions that
apply a constructive possession doctrine via a statutory provision).
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over a firearm at a given time. '45  This happens when the defendant is
caught "redhanded," with the object in his hands or on his person.
Of course, a person's possessions are not always physically on his
person, and frequently, the government will want to charge someone
with possessing something the defendant did not actually possess at the
time alleged in the indictment. 46 The legal theory for bringing such
prosecutions is "constructive possession." Constructive possession is
"possession in law, but not in fact.",47 It is "the gray zone between actual
physical possession and proximity to [an object]. 48 Most circuits define
constructive possession as having the power and intention to exercise
control or dominion.49
Within the Tenth Circuit, the precise definition for this concept var-
ies slightly from case to case. Some definitions have required proof that
the defendant intended to possess the item. 50  Other cases have required
the government to prove the defendant "knowingly has ownership, do-
minion or control" over the object.5 1 The definition relied on in the most
recent cases requires the government to prove the defendant "knowingly
has the power to exercise dominion or control. 52 Thus, in Jameson, the
court defined constructive possession as "when a person 'knowingly
holds the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over [an
object]."'' 53  A common example of constructive possession is an item
belonging to an individual but left in his house or car. "[O]ne can pos-
sess an object while it is hidden at home in a bureau drawer, or while
held by an agent, or even while it is secured in a safe deposit box at the
bank and can be retrieved only when a bank official opens the vault. 54
45. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209.
46. Courts have sometimes treated objects found somewhere other than on the defendant's
person as actual possession cases, such as when the only link between a defendant and a gun found
not on his person was testimony that a witness saw the defendant put the gun there. See, e.g., United
States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 787-88 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 946-47
(D.C. Cir. 2004). In these cases, the location where the gun was found suggests nothing about the
defendant's relationship to the gun, so the jury must either accept the witness's testimony and find
the defendant actually possessed the gun or reject the witness's testimony and find the defendant
never had possession.
47. United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511,516 (10th Cir. 1980).
48. Caudill, supra note 4, at 546.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir.
2007); United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. McFarlane, 491
F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Piwowar, 492 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (1 1th Cir. 2006); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 222
(2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2005).
50. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2004); United States
v. McCoy, 781 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1985); Zink, 612 F.2d at 516.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1177 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1298 (10th Cir. 2000).
52. United States v. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987).
53. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lopez, 372 F.3d at 1211).
54. United States v. Zavala-Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1994).
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Not surprisingly, this doctrine is useful "where actual possession at the
time of arrest can not be shown, but where the inference that there has
been possession at one time is exceedingly strong. '55 "The problem is
not so much with the idea as with deciding how far it should be car-
ried. 56
In cases of sole occupancy, constructive possession can be inferred
from the fact that the object was found in a place where the defendant
had exclusive control. For example, a person living alone has construc-
tive possession of everything in his apartment, even when he is at work:
"When a defendant has exclusive possession of the premises on which a
firearm is found, knowledge, dominion, and control can be properly in-
ferred because of the exclusive possession alone., 57 "This inference has
been deemed reasonable because one in exclusive control or possession
of an area is presumed to have knowledge of its contents, the ability to
control its contents, and the intent to exercise that control."58
The matter is trickier when the defendant has joint control over the
area where the object is found. "[I]n joint occupancy cases, knowledge,
dominion, and control may not be inferred simply by the defendant's
proximity to a firearm." 59 That is, the fact that a gun is found in a room
or car where the defendant is present should not establish constructive
possession if others had access to that area. Or, where the defendant was
not present, the fact that a gun was found in an area where he shared ac-
cess, such as a closet or dresser, does not establish constructive posses-
sion. "[W]hen 'two or more people occupy a given space ... the gov-
ernment is required to meet a higher burden in proving constructive pos-
session."' 60  Specifically, in the Tenth Circuit "the government must
'present some evidence to show some connection or nexus between the
defendant and the firearm."' 61 The issue for the jury, then, would be
whether one of several occupants in a car had a connection with a gun
found there, or whether an absent spouse had some connection with a
gun found in a shared closet.
The most recent discussion of the nexus requirement is Jameson,
which described the precedent defining this requirement as "cryptic.
62
55. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 755 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
56. Zavala-Maldonado, 23 F.3d at 7.
57. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209.
58. Rabinowitz, supra note 16, at 455.
59. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209.
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006)).
61. Id.
62. Id. The Tenth Circuit has discussed constructive possession in a couple of cases since
Jameson, but neither bears on this discussion. In United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229, 1257
(10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth Circuit upheld a drug possession conviction based on constructive pos-
session. However, the contours of the nexus requirement was not at issue despite the fact that de-
fendant had no connection to the apartment where the drugs were found. The court stated that "the
legally determinative relationship is not the one connecting [the defendant] to the apartment, but the
relationship linking [him] to the seized methamphetaniine." Id. at 1250. The conviction was af-
[Vol. 85:3
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However, Jameson made some points abundantly clear. First, "where
the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowledge of and access
to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer dominion and con-
trol. ' 6 3 Second, in contrast to almost every other circuit, 64 "intent to pos-
sess is not required by § 922(g). 'It is not necessary to show that the
defendant intended to exercise ... dominion or control."'' 65 These two
principles eliminate the well-settled principle that proximity alone will
not support a constructive possession theory 66 by essentially allowing a
conviction to stand based on proximity alone.
C. Development of the Doctrine
A review of the development of this doctrine in the Tenth Circuit
may help us understand how the court arrived at its holding in Jameson.
1. Lucero v. United States
It appears the Tenth Circuit's first opportunity to discuss construc-
tive possession was in 1962 in Lucero v. United States.67 In Lucero, two
defendants were prosecuted for two instances of selling heroin to an un-
dercover officer. 68 In the first instance, Defendant Lucero and Defendant
Maestas sat with an undercover officer in the booth of a tavern. The
officer testified that he negotiated the price with Maestas, but when he
went to pay Maestas, Maestas responded, "No, not here., 69 Lucero inter-
jected that the officer should pay Maestas, and then they would go
somewhere else for the delivery. The officer said he would not pay until
he got the drugs, so the trio left, and at some point Lucero, not Maestas,
gave the drugs to the officer.70
In the second instance, the officer saw Maestas sitting in a car out-
side a lounge where he was to meet Lucero for another buy.7' The offi-
cer approached Maestas, who told him Lucero was inside. The officer
found Lucero and bought more heroin from him, and as the officer was
firmed based on evidence showing that the defendant directed the movement of the drugs. Id. In
United States v. Mendez, No. 06-3282, 2008 WL 192861 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 2008), the defendant did
not raise a legal challenge to a firearm conviction, arguing only that the evidence was insufficient.
The court easily affirmed where the gun was found under a mattress next to the defendant's drug
ledger.
63. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209 (quoting United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th
Cir. 2004)).
64. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
65. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1211 n.2 (quoting Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179).
66. See Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1211 (recognizing that the instruction in the case "invites the
argument that proximity might be used as the only circumstantial evidence proving knowledge and
access" (constructive possession)).
67. 311 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1962). Although the Tenth Circuit does not appear to have previ-
ously discussed constructive possession of contraband, its use in the criminal context apparently
extends as far back as the late 1800s. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 754.
68. Lucero, 311 F.2d at 458.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 458-59.
71. Id. at 459.
2008]
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72walking away, he saw Lucero get in Maestas's car and drive away.
Both were charged with two counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 174,73 and
Maestas challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him.
7
4
Although the court did not articulate its own definition of construc-
tive possession, it noted a Second Circuit definition: "a person who is
sufficiently associated with the persons having physical custody so that
he is able, without difficulty, to cause the drug to be produced for a cus-
tomer can also be found by a jury to have dominion and control over the
drug, and therefore possession., 75 Thus, on the first count, the court af-
firmed because Maestas "was the moving party, ... he vouched for the
quality of the heroin, and.., he set the price. 76 This evidence, the court
stated, "shows more than mere participation in a narcotics transaction.,
77
Thus, Maestas "may not escape the consequences of his conduct by
avoiding actual contact with the contraband drug.
78
In contrast, the evidence was insufficient to convict Maestas on the
second count. "In this episode Maestas made none of the arrangements,
was not the moving party, and did nothing from which constructive pos-
session may be inferred., 79  Judge Seth issued a dissenting opinion,
which disagreed on factual rather than legal grounds. He argued that
"[t]he meaning of the word 'possession' . . . requires a much stronger
showing of dominion and control by Maestas than was made in this
case."80 He agreed that Maestas should be convicted "if the evidence
shows that [he] was able to control the drug or cause it to be produced,"
but he disagreed that the government had established "that Maestas had
such dominion or control over the drugs that he could cause them to be
produced through or by Lucero or anyone else.
81
This early opinion is significant because it makes clear that Maes-
tas's mere presence was not enough to establish constructive possession.
Even "participation" in the transaction would not have been enough to
establish constructive possession. The majority sustained the first count
because it was satisfied (unlike Judge Seth) that the level of participation
in the case established that Maestas had the ability to exercise control
72. Id.
73. Id. at 458; see also 21 U.S.C. § 174 (repealed 1970) (section set penalties for bringing
narcotic drugs into the United States, conspiring to commit unlawful acts respecting such narcotic
drugs, and made unexplained possession of narcotic drugs (constructive possession) sufficient evi-
dence for conviction).
74. Lucero, 311 F.2d at 458.
75. Id. at 459 n.7 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1961)).




80. Id. at 460 (Seth, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 460-61 (Seth, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 85:3
HANDS OFF THE GUN!
over the drugs. In contrast, because there was no such evidence on the
second count, that count was reversed.
2. Amaya v. United States
The first case to define constructive possession for the Tenth Circuit
was Amaya v. United States.s2 Amaya involved a controlled drug buy in
which the defendant delivered drugs to a confidential informant on mul-
tiple occasions. 83  Regarding one transaction, the defendant acknowl-
edged that he was paid to deliver the package of drugs, but he argued that
he did not know the package contained drugs. 84 In the other transaction,
he acknowledged having contact with the informant, but he claimed he
gave the informant only a piece of paper and denied having given him
drugs.8 5
On appeal, the defendant challenged the district court's instructions
regarding possession. The district court instructed the jury that
actual possession meant that the defendant knowingly had manual,
personal or physical possession; that constructive possession meant
that although the narcotic may be in the physical possession of an-
other, the defendant knowingly had the power of exercising control
over it; that possession was not limited to manual touch or personal
custody; that it was sufficient to constitute possession under the stat-
ute if the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the narcotic
and control over it; and that "power to produce or dispose of the nar-
cotic was evidence of such control."
86
The district court also told the jury "that mere presence in the vicinity of
the narcotic or for that matter mere knowledge of its physical location
did not constitute possession." 87 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that
these instructions "correctly stated the law. 88
Amaya is important because it would be cited by a number of cases
that have contributed to the Tenth Circuit's current definition of con-
structive possession as "knowingly hold[ing] the power and ability to
exercise dominion and control over [the object]." 89 However, the fact
that Amaya's standard did not include an intent requirement should not
count for too much because the question of intent or any nexus was not
82. 373 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1967).
83. Id. at 198.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 199.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Landry,
257 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1958)).
89. United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Amaya, 373 F.2d at
199); see also United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Culpepper
and citing Amaya for this proposition); United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 516 (10th Cir. 1980)
(citing Amaya for the same definition).
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before the court in this case. The issue for the jury was whether it should
accept the informant's testimony that the defendant gave him the drugs
and the inference that the defendant did so knowingly or whether it
should accept the defendant's testimony to the contrary. 90 Significantly,
this early definition also made clear that simply being around contraband
was not enough to establish constructive possession.
3. United States v. Culpepper
In 1987, the Tenth Circuit introduced an important caveat to the
definition from Amaya. The charge in United States v. Culpepper91 was
possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, specifically two fields
where marijuana was being cultivated for harvest and sale.92 Defendant
Culpepper told an undercover officer that he was interested in selling two
fields of marijuana that he had planted but did not have time to harvest.
93
He took the officer to the fields, taught him how to harvest the mari-
juana, and showed him where in the vicinity he could hide it. 
94
Culpepper was convicted for possessing the two marijuana fields,
and he argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him. Culpepper's primary argument was that the lack of fences or
guards, the lack of evidence to suggest recent cultivation or care, and the
fact that he did not own the property showed there was no connection
between him and the property. 95 While these factors might bear on the
question of constructive possession, the Tenth Circuit found ample evi-
dence to link Culpepper to the field: his offer to sell the fields, his state-
ment that he had planted and harvested there, and the fact that it was
ready to be harvested just as he had said.96 However, starting with the
definition of constructive possession in Amaya, the Tenth Circuit added a
new requirement: "the government must establish that there was a suffi-
cient nexus between the accused and the drug."
97
4. United States v. Mills and Subsequent Cases Regarding Intent to
Exercise Dominion and Control
Since Culpepper, the Tenth Circuit has consistently recognized the
nexus requirement and has occasionally reversed a conviction based on
the insufficiency of the evidence establishing a nexus.98 One of these
90. 373 F.2d at 198-99.
91. 834 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1987).





97. Id. at 882 (citing United States v. Cardenas, 748 F.2d 1015, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1272 (11 th Cir. 1984)).
98. United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Taylor, 113
F.3d 1136, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government did not establish a nexus between
the defendant and a weapon found in a jointly occupied apartment despite witness testimony that the
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cases, United States i'. Mills,99 is frequently cited in constructive posses-
sion cases because of its contributions to the development of this doc-
trine.t 00
Mills involved a convicted felon who lived in a house with guns.
01
The case began when police officers came to the home that Defendant
Ervin Mills shared with Judy Hall on June 24, 1992. The officers had a
warrant to determine whether the engine in Hall's truck was stolen.
They decided to take the truck away so they could inspect it more
closely, but before doing so, they let Mills get Hall's belongings out of
the truck.102 Mills put Halls' things in his garage, including a Ruger pis-
tol and Winchester shotgun. Six days later, on June 30, officers returned
to the home with. another warrant, this time to search for a marijuana-
growing operation on the premises. 0 3 During the search, officers redis-
covered the pistol and shotgun from Hall's truck, now in a compartment
for extra leaves in the dining room table.'04
Mills was charged with possessing the firearms on June 30 but not
with possessing them on June 24.105 At trial, Hall testified "that she
placed the guns in the dining room table without Mills' knowledge and
contrary to his instructions.'
0 6
The Tenth Circuit again emphasized the need for the government to
establish a nexus in joint occupancy cases. It stated, "[i]n cases of joint
occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive possession
by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some con-
nection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contra-
band.' 1 7 The court continued: "A conviction based upon constructive
possession will be upheld 'only when there was some evidence support-
ing at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and
access to the weapon or contraband.'
10 8
defendant had previously possessed a gun); United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir.
1996) (reversing conviction for possession with intent to distribute drugs where the government did
not establish a nexus between car driver and drugs found in passenger's pockets); United States v.
Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549-50 (10th Cir. 1994).
99. 29 F.3d 545.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 205 F.App'x 656, 663 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2004).
101. Mills, 29 F.3d at 546-47.
102. Id. at 547.
103. Id.
104. Officers also found a .22 semi-automatic pistol under Halls's mattress, a rusted rifle in a
crawl space underneath the house, and two pipe bombs in the laundry room. Id. Mills was charged
with possessing the pipe bombs but was acquitted. Id. It is unclear whether he was charged with
possessing these other two guns, but the opinion only addresses the charges relating to the two guns
originally found in Halls's truck.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 550.
107. Id. at 549.
108. Id. at 549-50 (quoting United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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The evidence, however, failed to establish either the connection or
the knowledge necessary to support a conviction.
Even if the jury disbelieved the entire defense testimony, that disbe-
lief could not constitute evidence of the crimes charged and somehow
substitute for knowing constructive possession in this joint occu-
pancy situation. We are unwilling to infer knowledge of "dominion
and control" over Hall's guns contained in the compartment (and out
of view) on June 24 solely because Mills handled them and placed
them in the garage six days before in cooperation with law enforce-
ment. Nor was the defense required to prove that Mills was denied
access to Hall's table or compartment; rather, the government had to
come forward with evidence to connect Mills with knowing construc-
tive possession of the firearms extending beyond his handling them
on June 24. Mere dominion or control over the dining room was in-
sufficient to establish constructive possession.1
0 9
The precise rationale for this opinion is somewhat elusive, as it is
unclear whether the court reversed on the knowledge element or the
nexus requirement. On the one hand, it appears the court was concerned
by the lack of knowledge-although Mills had dominion and control
over the compartment where the guns were found, he did not know they
were there. The court said it was "unwilling to infer knowledge" from
the earlier possession. 110
The problem with this view is that the court did not rest on the lack
of knowledge but went on to cite the lack of a connection or nexus be-
tween Mills and the guns. "[T]he government had to come forward with
evidence to connect Mills with knowing constructive possession of the
firearms.""'  Had the court been focused solely on the mens rea, it could
have reversed without discussing the nexus requirement at all. Instead,
the court specifically stated that "the government had to come forward
with evidence to prove Mills knew the firearms were within his domin-
ion and control."'1 2 The court explicitly stated that the police-authorized
possession on June 24 could not qualify as a nexus."'
This caveat is significant because it shows that knowledge and ac-
cess are not enough to establish a nexus. At the time the officers left on
June 24 and police authorization terminated, Mills had the ability to ex-
ercise dominion and control over the guns, and he knew it. Thus, to say
there was no nexus on June 24, when Mills had knowledge of the weap-
ons, is to say that knowing access to firearms cannot, by itself, establish
the required nexus. There must be something more.
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As will be argued more completely, the implicit core of this nexus is
intent to exercise dominion or control over the item. But before turning
to those recent cases that explicitly reject intent as an aspect of this
nexus, it is worth pausing to note that from time to time the court has
sanctioned an intent requirement. In 1980, the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Zink' l4 upheld a conviction where the district court had in-
cluded an intent requirement in its definition of constructive posses-
sion. 15 In contrast to the constructive possession definition discussed
above, the court defined constructive possession as follows: "A person
who although not in actual possession knowingly has both the power and
the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing
either directly or indirectly or through another person or persons is then
in constructive possession of it." 116 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the conviction over a challenge to the jury instruction, stating that the
jury was "properly instructed" and calling this a "stock instruction on
this issue which has been affirmed many times."
' 1 7
Five years later, in United States v. McCoy, 118 the Tenth Circuit de-
fined constructive possession without reference to its own precedent,
citing instead standard language from the Fifth Circuit that included an
intent requirement. "The defendant had constructive possession if he had
the intent and the power to exercise dominion and control over the weap-
ons as charged."' 19
Most recently, in 2004, the Tenth Circuit again affirmed the same
jury instruction it called "stock" in 1980.120 However, that case did not
raise a question about intent, and in defining constructive possession, the
court used the standard definition going back to Amaya, which does not
include an intent requirement.' 21 In short, until 2004, the limits of con-
structive possession had been discussed primarily in terms of the nexus
requirement, though we can see the intent requirement popping up from
time to time.
5. Focusing on an Intent Requirement: United States v. Colonna
and United States v. Ledford
The first case to specifically discuss an intent requirement in the
context of constructive possession was United States v. Colonna,
122
which specifically held in 2004 that knowledge of and access to a gun
establish an adequate nexus and that the constructive possession does not
114. 612 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1980).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 516 n. I (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 516.
118. 781 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1985).
119. Id. at 171 (quoting United States v. Smith, 591 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir. 1979)).
120. United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
121. Jd. at 1211-12.
122. 360 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2004).
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require proof that the defendant intended to exercise dominion or control
over the object.
123
The facts of Colonna are straightforward. Officers executed a war-
rant on Defendant Colonna's home and found guns and ammunition in a
dresser drawer in his bedroom, along with a marijuana pipe. 24 Colonna
claimed the guns were his wife's. Colonna's wife testified that the guns
and ammunition were in her bedside dresser, not her husband's. 25 How-
ever, she also testified that her husband had taken a marijuana pipe from
their son and put it in his bedside dresser. Another officer testified that
Colonna had admitted that he knew the guns were there, that he should
not have had them, but that the guns belonged to his wife.
126
The Tenth Circuit began with a typical recitation of the applicable
law, ending with this proviso: "In order to sustain a conviction based
upon constructive possession, the government must present 'evidence
supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowl-
edge of and access to the weapon or contraband.'" 2 7 From this proposi-
tion, the court concluded: "Thus, knowledge and access are required to
prove that the defendant knowingly held the power to exercise dominion
and control over the firearm.
1 28
One aspect of Colonna that separates it from all preceding Tenth
Circuit cases is that the defendant specifically argued that constructive
possession requires the government to prove intention to exercise domin-
ion and control. 129  The court rejected this issue of first impression.
"[W]here the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowledge of
and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer dominion
or control. It is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to
exercise that dominion or control.
1 30
In light of these legal rulings, Colonna's sufficiency argument was
doomed. The court reasoned that a jury could have concluded the
dresser where the guns were found was Colonna's, not his wife's. 131
From that inference, the jury could appropriately infer that he had
knowledge of and access to them.
123. Id. at 1179.
124. Id. at 1173.
125. Id. at 1179.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting United States v. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2002)). Inter-
estingly, the "knowledge and access" language apparently originated with Mills. Hien Van Tieu
attributes this language to United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001). Heck-
ard, 238 F.3d at 1228, in turn, cites United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1994).
128. Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1180.
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While it is true that prior Tenth Circuit precedent did not require
evidence of intent, the court did not address the merits of an intent re-
quirement. This hasty rejection is particularly troubling because the
court could have easily affirmed without rejecting the rule on a fact-
based sufficiency challenge. Taken together, from the facts that the guns
were in Colonna's dresser, that he knew they were there, and that he
knew he should not have them, the jury could reasonably have found
both the power and the intention to exercise dominion and control over
them. Thus, instead of rejecting the requirement without considering its
merits, the Tenth Circuit could have left the issue unresolved and simply
affirmed under either standard.
After Colonna, the next significant case to discuss an intent re-
quirement 132 was United States v. Ledford.'33 Ledford arose out of a po-
lice response to a domestic violence complaint. Officers responded to
the home where defendant Ledford lived with his girlfriend Kathleen
Carey. Carey told officers that Ledford had threatened to kill her with a
gun, and she led them to a .41 caliber handgun in the top drawer of a
dresser inside the house and told them it was Ledford's. 134 Meanwhile
other officers arrested Ledford, who was walking nearby. One officer
asked Ledford about the gun, and he responded that a friend had given it
to him a couple of months earlier to fix, but he knew he should not have
a gun because he was a convicted felon.'
35
At trial, Ledford requested a jury instruction that would have re-
quired the government to establish that he "knowingly ha[d] both the
power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control
over a thing.', 136 The government objected to this instruction under Co-
lonna, and the court gave an instruction that did not require a showing of
intent. It told the jury:
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has the
power at any given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing,
either directly or indirectly through another person, is then in con-
structive possession of it. To prove constructive possession the gov-
ernment must prove that the defendant had knowledge of and access
to the firearm.
137
132. Interestingly, between Colonna and Ledford, the court upheld a jury instruction that
required the jury to find both power and intent to exercise dominion and control. United States v.
Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004). However, the intent requirement was not at issue in
Lopez.
133. 443 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006).
134. Id. at 705-06.
135. Id. at 705.
136. Id. at 706.
137. Id. at 714.
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Ledford raised four legal arguments in support of an intent require-
ment.' 38 First, Ledford argued that Colonna was inconsistent with prior
case law, specifically those cases discussed above that ratified a jury
instruction with intent language.1 39 The court properly noted that these
cases did not "address intent because the issue was not raised on ap-
peal."'140  Moreover, these opinions themselves, along with most other
Tenth Circuit opinions, defined constructive possession without refer-
ence to intent. 141
Ledford next argued that without an intent requirement, § 922(g)(1)
became a general intent crime rather than a specific intent crime. 142 The
court did not reject this reasoning but concluded that it was not a prob-
lem: "Congress may criminalize knowing acts committed without spe-
cific intent.,
143
Third, Ledford challenged the instruction for lack of a nexus re-
quirement 44 The court agreed that a showing of some nexus was re-
quired, but it reasoned that under Colonna, the instruction was appropri-
ate: "[W]e made it clear that knowledge and access together are suffi-
cient to show nexus, and the jury was instructed on that principle.' 4a
Ledford argued that knowledge and access were insufficient to establish
a nexus in Mills, to which the court responded that Mills was factually
distinct:
There, the government failed to show sufficient evidence of construc-
tive possession when the defendant had placed guns in the garage of
a residence six days prior to the guns being found in the dining room.
We held the government did not come forward with the necessary
evidence to connect Mr. Mills with knowing constructive possession
of the firearms beyond his handling them on the prior date. Mere
dominion or control over the dining room was insufficient to estab-
lish constructive possession.1
46
In contrast, Carey linked Ledford to the gun, and Ledford himself
told two others that he knowingly possessed the gun. The court con-
cluded that this evidence was sufficient to establish a nexus, but left
138. Ledford also tried to distinguish Colonna on its facts, but the factual distinction was
inconsequential. Id. at 715.
139. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text; see also Ledford, 443 F.3d at 716.
140. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 715.
141. Id. at 715-16 (discussing United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 516 (10th Cir. 1980)).
142. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 716.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 716-17.
146. Id. (citing United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994)). As discussed above, this
analysis of Mills falls short because it ignores the fact that the court was adamant in saying that
Mills did not have constructive possession when he knew the guns were left unsecured in his garage.
See supra notes 108 and 109 and accompanying text.
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"open the possibility that there may be a future case in which the specific
facts require a harder look at the nexus requirement."'
' 47
Finally, Ledford argued that the recent Tenth Circuit Proposed Pat-
tern Criminal Jury Instructions required an intent instruction. 148 Since
Ledford, the court has adopted a pattern instruction that does not include
an intent requirement. 149 However, at the time, a proposed pattern in-
struction would have told jurors that "[a] person who, although not in
actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a
given time to exercise dominion or control over an object, either directly
or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession
of it.' 50 Although these proposed instructions included an intent re-
quirement, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow that recommendation on
the ground that the proposed instructions had not been adopted and were
subject to approval on a case-by-case basis."'l
D. Jameson and the Nexus Requirement
As noted above, 152 the Tenth Circuit most recently addressed the
content of the nexus requirement in United States v. Jameson.
53
Jameson's appeal raised two claims related to constructive possession.'
54
First, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the
gun found on the floor of a car occupied by three other individuals.
155
Second, he claimed that the jury instruction misled the jury because it
failed to require proof of any connection between him and the gun in
joint possession cases.
56
The Tenth Circuit rejected both these claims. On the sufficiency
claim, the Tenth Circuit began by defining constructive possession.
"Constructive possession exists when a person 'knowingly holds the
power and ability to exercise dominion and control over [a firearm]."
' 157
It further recognized that "in joint occupancy cases, knowledge, domin-
ion, and control may not be inferred simply by the defendant's proximity
147. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 717.
148. Id.
149. TENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 1.31 (2006), available at
http://www.ck10.uscourts.gov/downloads/pji 10-cir-crim.pdf.
150. CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (PROPOSED) § 1.31 (REV. AUG. 9, 2004) (em-
phasis added).
151. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 717. The version that was ultimately adopted eliminated the intent
language. See TENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 149, at § 1.31.
152. See supra Part I.A.
153. 478 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2007).
154. Jameson also raised a third claim related to a mistrial motion that is not within the scope
of this article.
155. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1206.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004)).
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to a firearm. Instead, the government must present evidence to show
some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm.' ' 8
The court cited Colonna for the proposition that "knowledge and
access are required to prove that [a] defendant knowingly held the power
to exercise dominion and control over [a] firearm." 159 This meant, how-
ever, that "where the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowl-
edge of and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer
dominion and control.' 160 The court again reiterated that "[p]roximity
alone . . . is insufficient to establish knowledge and access to (and do-
minion and control over) a firearm in a join occupancy case.''
Turning to the facts, the court found sufficient evidence of a nexus,
namely "Mr. Jameson's proximity to the pistol . . . coupled with [his]
furtive movements, his inferred physical contact with the pistol (his foot
was on top of it), and the pistol's being in plain view and easily retriev-
able to a passenger in Mr. Jameson's seat."
162
Having thus found a nexus, the court then turned to the jury instruc-
tion, which had eliminated any requirement that the jury find a nexus.
163
The court acknowledged that Jameson's proposed instruction "was pref-
erable to that used by the district court because it expressly stated that
mere control over the area near the firearm (in other words, proximity) is
insufficient, by itself, to establish constructive possession."''64 Further-
more, the court's instruction "invites the argument that proximity might
be used as the only circumstantial evidence proving knowledge and ac-
cess."'165 Although one would expect this defect to be fatal, the court
affirmed the instruction on the ground that a different instruction told the
jury that "merely being present with others who have possession of the
object does not constitute possession.'' 66 Coupled with the paragraph on
momentary control of an object, these instructions "adequately informed
the jury that mere proximity is not sufficient to establish constructive
possession."'167  Although Ledford had anticipated a future case that
would "require a harder look at the nexus requirement," the court de-
cided that Jameson was not that case.'
68
158. Id. (quoting United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006)).
159. Id. (quoting United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2004)).
160. Id. (quoting Michel, 446 F.3d at 1128).
161. Id. (quoting United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 572 (10th Cir. 2000)).
162. Id. at 1210.
163. For the jury instruction, see supra Part 1.A. and accompanying text.




168. Id. at 1212 (quoting United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 717 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE TENTH CIRCUIT RULE
The Tenth Circuit's line of reasoning as reflected in Jameson has
two primary defects. First, the court's reliance on Colonna and that
case's rejection of an intent requirement runs contrary to every other
circuit and eliminates an important protection for defendants. Second,
allowing the district court to equate knowledge and access with construc-
tive possession, as in Ledford and Jameson, reflects an unsound exten-
sion of Colonna and effectively eliminates the nexus requirement.
A. Intent to Exercise Dominion and Control
The first defect from this recent line of cases is that it allows the
government to establish constructive possession without requiring proof
that the defendant intended to exercise control or dominion over the fire-
arm. Colonna held that "where the defendant in a joint occupancy situa-
tion has knowledge of and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient
nexus to infer dominion or control. It is not necessary to show that the
defendant intended to exercise that dominion or control.' 69
Before addressing the merits of such a rule, it is worth noting that
the court did not need to reject whole cloth an intent requirement in order
to uphold the jury verdict. In United States v. Walls, 170 the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed a conviction where the jury had not been instructed on in-
tent. However, in doing so, it specifically noted that the evidence before
it would have supported a jury verdict had the jury been properly in-
structed as to what inferences it might make.'17 Relevant to the Colonna
analysis, the Seventh Circuit specifically noted that "[a] jury could infer
that [the defendant] had both knowledge and intent to exercise dominion
and control over [a gun] merely from its presence in the bedroom that
[the defendant] shared with [another person].' 72 Put more broadly, it is
not impossible that the facts of the case would support an inference not
only of knowledge and access, but also intent. Consistent with this prin-
ciple, the Colonna court, rather than reject the intent requirement without
any discussion of the merits of the rule, could have simply held that the
arguable location of the gun-in Colonna's bedside drawer--established
not only knowledge and access but also intent to exercise dominion and
control over the gun.
In any case, Colonna squarely conflicts with the rule in the other
circuits, which have held that constructive possession requires proof of
not only the power but also the intent to exercise dominion or control
169. United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1994)).
170. 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000).
171. Id. at 867.
172. Id.
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over an object.'7 3 Although the D.C. Circuit has not adopted such a defi-
nition in a published opinion, it has done so in an unpublished decision
74
and has also approved a jury instruction that used such a definition.
175
Consistent with this requirement, these courts have also included an in-
tent requirement in their pattern jury instructions.
176
173. See, e.g., United States v. McFarlane, 491 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[A] conviction for
constructive possession requires proof that a 'person knowingly has the power and intention at a
given time to exercise dominion over an object."') (quoting United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302,
309 (1st Cir. 2006)); United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) ("To demonstrate
constructive possession, the Government must submit sufficient evidence to support an inference
that the individual 'knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise do-
minion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons."') (citation
omitted); United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that in constructive
possession cases, "[tihe government must offer evidence to prove that the defendant (1) knew that
the thing was present, and (2) intended to exercise dominion or control over it."); United States v.
Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007) (.'[c]onstructive possession exists when a person does
not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to
exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others."') (quoting United
States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879,
889 (7th Cir. 2007) ("'Defendants are in constructive possession of a gun if they have the power and
the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or
through others."') (quoting United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 2000)); United States
v. Piwowar, 492 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Constructive possession 'requires knowledge of an
object, the ability to control it, and the intent to do so."') (quoting United States v. Cuevas-
Arrendondo, 469 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 222 (2d
Cir. 2006) ("Constructive possession exists when a person ... knowingly has the power and the
intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through
others.") (citing United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1992)); United States v. Greer,
440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (1 1th Cir. 2006) ("Constructive possession exists when the defendant exercises
ownership, dominion, or control over the item or has the power and intent to exercise dominion or
control."); United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2005) ("When the government
seeks to establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1), it must prove that the defendant inten-
tionally exercised dominion and control over the firearm, or had the power and the intention to
exercise dominion and control over the firearm .... "); United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 278
(9th Cir. 1990) ("In the more difficult situation where the premises are shared by more than one
person, ... a party has knowledge of the weapon and both the power and the intention to exercise
dominion and control over it, then he has constructive possession.") (quoted in United States v. Ruiz,
462 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2006)).
174. United States v. Johnson, No. CR 91-00142-01, 1993 WL 390062, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
30, 1993) ("A person has constructive possession of an object when he knowingly has the power and
intent to exercise dominion and control over it."). The D.C. Circuit's more recent, published deci-
sions apparently limit the doctrine with a requirement similar to the Tenth Circuit's nexus require-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Littlejohn, 489 F.3d 1335, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("To establish
constructive possession, the government must show that the defendant knew of, and was in a posi-
tion to exercise dominion and control over, the contraband. Thus, there must be something more
than mere presence at the scene of a criminal transaction. There must be some action, some word, or
some conduct that links the individual to the contraband.") (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
175. United States v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
176. FIRST CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 4.06 (1998) ("A person who
is not in actual possession, but who has both the power and the intention to exercise control over
something is in constructive possession of it."); THIRD CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CRIMINAL § 6.18.922G-4 (2007) ("If you find that (name) ... had the power and intention to exer-
cise control over it, even though it was not in (name)'s physical possession-that is, that (name) had
the ability to take actual possession of the object when (name) wanted to do so--you may find that
the government has proven possession."); FIFTH CIRCUIT PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
§ 1.31 (2001) ("A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and
the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through
another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it."); SIXTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
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It is true that these circuits occasionally omit an intent requirement
from a definition of constructive possession. 177 However, these defini-
tions arise in the context of cases challenging other aspects of possession
or constructive possession. No circuit beside the Tenth has ever held that
constructive possession may be established without a showing of intent
to exercise control or dominion.
1. Making Intent a Triable Issue in Other Circuits
A brief look at some of these cases illustrates why an intent re-
quirement is so crucial. The main reason for adopting an intent require-
ment is that a defendant's intent may be the only fact distinguishing in-
nocent and guilty conduct. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has recog-
nized that constructive possession cases invite arguments about a defen-
dant's intent in ways that are not raised by an actual possession case.
178
In constructive possession cases, knowledge and intent are frequently
at issue. A defendant will often deny any knowledge of a thing found
in an area that is under his control (e.g., a residence, an automobile)
or claim that it was placed there by accident or mistake. The gov-
ernment then must offer evidence to prove that the "defendant (1)
knew that the thing was present, and (2) intended to exercise domin-
ion or control over it. In contrast, the only knowledge that the gov-
ernment must show in an actual possession prosecution is the defen-
dant's awareness that (1) he physically possesses the thing, and (2)
the thing he possesses is contraband. Intent is not an element of ac-
tual possession under § 922."
179
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.10 (2007) ("To establish constructive possession, the government
must prove that the defendant had the right to exercise physical control over the [firearm] and knew
that he had this right, and that he intended to exercise physical control over [the firearm] at some
time, either directly or through other persons."); SEVENTH CIRCUIT FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL 922(g) (1999) ("Possession may exist even when a person is not in physical contact with
the object, but knowingly has the power and intention to exercise direction or control over it, either
directly or through others."); EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
§ 8.02 (2007) ("A person who, although not in actual possession, has both the power and the inten-
tion at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another
person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it."); NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 3.18 (2003) ("A person has possession of something if the person ... knows of its
presence and has the power and intention to control it."); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 6 (2003) ("A person who is not in actual possession, but who has both
the power and the intention to later take control over something either alone or together with some-
one else, is in constructive possession of it.").
177. See, e.g., United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 395 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 878 (4th Cir. 1992)). In Moye, the court stated: "Constructive possession
is established if it is shown 'that the defendant exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and
control over the item."' Id. However, this was an actual possession case, and the precise definition
of constructive possession was not at issue.
178. Jones, 484 F.3d at 788.
179. Id. (citation omitted).
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A couple of cases illustrate how defendants have put intent at issue
in triable ways.' 80 In United States v. Piwowar,181 the defendant was
prosecuted for possessing guns and ammunition seized from a padlocked,
walk-in refrigerator found in a building owned by him but leased to a
woman who could lawfully possess them.'8 2 It was undisputed that the
guns belonged to the defendant before he became a convicted felon. At
trial, the woman testified that she had purchased the weapons from the
defendant but had never moved them after taking possession of them.'
83
Thus, the defendant argued that he had no intention to exercise dominion
or control over these weapons that he had sold to the woman and were
kept in her part of the building.
The Eighth Circuit recognized that "[a] jury might have accepted
this testimony and concluded he no longer possessed the firearms and
ammunition.' 84  However, because the woman also acknowledged that
the defendant was the only one with a key to the refrigerator where the
guns were kept, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the jury could properly
have found an intention to exercise dominion and control and affirmed
the conviction.
185
In United States v. McFarlane,'86 Detective David Delehoy heard
the sound of gunshots and saw Antwone Moore sprinting away from the
area from where the sound came. 187 From his patrol car, Delehoy lost
sight of Moore behind some buildings but saw him emerge a few seconds
later, this time walking rapidly. Delehoy also saw Defendant Clive
McFarlane following Moore, about 100 feet behind. 18  Delehoy drove to
meet Moore, who told him McFarlane was trying to shoot him. About
that time, Delehoy saw McFarlane approach a set of trash cans along the
path that Moore had traveled. McFarlane took the liner from the trash
can, leaned into the can with both arms, and stood up to replace the
liner.'8 9 Based on this sequence of events, Delehoy arrested McFarlane
180. The cases discussed in this section are not the only ones that show why an intent require-
ment is so important. See, e.g., United States v. Paredes-Rodriguez, 160 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1998)
(noting that omission of an intent requirement was "less than ideal" but holding omission was harm-
less on the facts of the case); United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that instruction that lacked intent requirement was improper but that defendant waived any
challenge to the error); United States v. Martin, 180 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing con-
structive possession conviction on ground that "[k]nowledge of the possible location of a firearm
here is not a showing of power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object").
181. 492 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2007).
182. Id. at 954-55.
183. Id. at 955.
184. Id. at 956.
185. Id.
186. 491 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2007).
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and then found a gun with six spent ammunition cases in the trash that
had interested McFarlane.'
90
McFarlane was charged with possessing that gun. At trial, he testi-
fied that he and Moore had gotten in a fight, during which Moore had
tried to shoot him.' 9' McFarlane testified that Moore then fled, and he
followed, stopping only to look in the trash can out of curiosity. 192 The
district court told the jury that constructive possession was "the power
and intention at any given time to exercise control or dominion of the
object" and gave an example to illustrate the concept. 93 However, the
jury presented two separate questions to the court: (1) "Does looking for
the gun constitute intent to exercise control and dominion over the gun?"
and (2) "Does opening the trash bag, with the intent to find the gun,
which is indeed there, constitute putting himself in the position to have
the power to exercise control and dominion over the gun?"' 94
McFarlane asked for a specific instruction that would have told the
jury that "mere curiosity ... coupled with a direct look at the gun...
does not establish constructive possession. ' 95 The court decided not to
specifically answer the question, committing the central issue of intent to
the jury:
As I told you, possession requires... both the ability and intention to
take physical control of an object. You are asking me to decide
whether a particular act by itself constitutes intent to exercise control
and whether.., doing something with that intent then puts the de-
fendant in the position of having the power to exercise control....
And all I can tell you is that you need to look at all of the evidence of
what occurred. You need to look-particularly with respect to in-
tent-you need to look at everything the defendant did, at everything
he said, and the circumstances that existed at the time that he acted
and spoke and decide from all of that whether he had the intent at a
particular point in time that you're considering to exercise control
over the object.
196
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's instruction as a
proper statement of the law.' 97
McFarlane shows how a defendant's intent can be the only distinc-
tion between guilty and innocent conduct. The jury's question about
"looking for the gun" suggests the jurors may have accepted McFarlane's
story that he was chasing the person who had tried to shoot him. The
190. Id.
191. Id. at 56.
192. Id
193. Id. at 58.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 59.
196. Id. at 58-59.
197. Id. at 61.
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court's response made clear that it did not want to tell the jury there
could be no intent on these facts as a matter of law. But at the same
time, it left open the possibility that McFarlane might be innocent, de-
pending on how the jury resolved the question of his intent. If it was true
that McFarlane was just curious and had no intention to exercise control
over the gun, he should have been acquitted. Indeed, the First Circuit
recognized that "the main dispute at trial was over McFarlane's intent in
going to the trash can."'
' 98
These cases present tough factual questions suitable for a jury. Pi-
wowar is a case where the defendant claimed he tried to distance himself
from the guns but was still linked factually to them. McFarlane is a case
where the defendant claimed he crossed paths with the gun but had no
intention to take possession. In both cases, the circuit courts recognized
that a jury could have accepted the defendants' claims and acquitted.
2. Same Cases, Tenth Circuit
In contrast, neither Piwowar nor McFarlane would have posed a
triable issue in the Tenth Circuit, even if the jury accepted the defen-
dants' version of the facts. Piwowar would have no basis for acquittal
because he knew the guns were in the walk-in refrigerator (he put them
there originally) and he had access (a key to the refrigerator). McFarlane
knew the gun was in the trash can (at least by the time he looked in there)
and he had access (as seen by his rummaging). In the Tenth Circuit,
McFarlane's requested instruction-that merely looking at the gun out of
curiosity was not constructive possession-would not only have been
unwarranted. It would have been wrong. And neither case would have
any legal hope for acquittal.' 99
The First Circuit put it well:
The issue of intention is quite as important as the issue of power.
Someone might have effective power over [contraband] simply be-
cause [it was] located within reach while [its] true owner was tempo-
rarily absent; but if such a person had power over the [contraband]
(say, as a temporary visitor to the room [or car] in which [it was] lo-
cated) but had no intention to exercise that power, there might still be
no crime.
200
198. Id. at 59.
199. Under such circumstances, the only reason to go to trial would be the hope for jury nulli-
fication. This is a risky strategy because courts may not give a nullification instruction. While jury
nullification is certainly unlikely, it is not impossible. In one memorable case in the District of Utah,
the defendant charged with constructively possessing a firearm found in his bedroom closet actually
prevailed at trial on what was essentially a jury nullification theory. United States v. Morales, No.
1:03-cr-56-PGC (2003) (acquitting defendant despite admission that he had handled the gun).
200. United States v. Zavala-Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 280 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Constructive possession] cases also add some element
that distinguishes possession from mere presence or accessibility. It is not enough that a person has
[Vol. 85:3
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B. Equation of Nexus with Knowledge and Access
A related problem is the analytical chasm between Colonna and
Ledford that has essentially eliminated the value of the nexus require-
ment. Colonna was a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case that held upheld a
conviction where the evidence supported the inference that the defendant
had knowledge of and access to the firearm. 20 1 The court stated that
"knowledge and access are required to prove that the defendant know-
ingly held the power to exercise dominion and control over the fire-
arm. '20 2 The court continued, "where the defendant in a joint occupancy
situation has knowledge of and access to the weapons, there is a suffi-
cient nexus to infer dominion or control. 20 3 As discussed above, the
court could have stopped right here, but it continued on to hold that "[i]t
is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to exercise that do-
minion or control. 20 4
In equating constructive possession with knowledge and access, Co-
lonna cites United States v. Gorman.20 5 But a closer look at Gorman
suggests why Colonna's logic is problematic. Gorman states: "The gov-
ernment may satisfy the element of knowing possession of a firearm by
showing constructive possession: where a defendant 'knowingly hold[s]
the power to exercise dominion or control over the firearm.' 20 6 Knowl-
edge and control can be inferred where a defendant has exclusive posses-
sion of the premises, but where a defendant jointly occupies the premises
the government must "show some connection or nexus between the de-
fendant and the firearm or other contraband., 20 7  While it is true that
Gorman recognizes the importance of knowledge and access (control),
Colonna ignores the significance of the nexus requirement. The knowl-
edge and access that create an inference of constructive possession in a
sole occupancy situation do not create such an inference in a joint occu-
pancy situation in the absence of a nexus.
From Colonna, the Tenth Circuit next upheld instructions that sub-
stituted the idea of knowledge and access for the nexus requirement. In
Ledford, the court told the jury that "[a] person who, although not in ac-
tual possession, knowingly has the power at any given time to exercise
dominion or control over a thing.., is then in constructive possession of
it.' '2° 8 In Jameson, it told the jury that "constructive possession may be
shown by . . . evidence, which establishes . . . that the defendant had
the power to control the contraband, in the sense that he simply is in the presence of the contraband
and could reach out and take it.").
201. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
202. United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
203. Id.
204. Id
205. 312 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2002).
206. Id. at 1164 (citation omitted).
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
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knowledge that the firearm was contained in the place and the defendant
had the ability to access the firearm."
209
The problem with these instructions is that they essentially "direct a
verdict" for the prosecution because the court, rather than the jury, de-
cides whether certain conduct rises to the level of constructive posses-
sion.210 One scholar studying constructive possession cases in Texas
state courts identified over thirty variables relevant to deciding whether
there was a nexus between a person and an object. 211 He notes:
The search for a link between the accused and the contraband is not
just a qualitative, logical exercise in thinking; the link represents a
compendium of the concrete factual elements of the case. The facts
themselves must draw the accused toward the contraband or, on the
contrary, separate the accused from the circle of control and access
which constitutes possession.
212
To say that only two of those (knowledge and access) always con-
stitutes constructive possession unfairly takes the nexus requirement
away from the jury. Rather than deciding whether a nexus exists in light
of many circumstantial considerations, the jury decides only whether two
particular circumstances exist. And if they do, under the instructions
given in Ledford and Jameson, they must convict.
A Seventh Circuit case illustrates this problem. In United States v.
Walls,213 the district court told the jury: "[C]onstructive possession as
used in these instructions is the ability to control cocaine or a gun.
' 214
The Seventh Circuit held that this instruction was improper because it
"failed to adequately apprise the jury of the need to find intent.,
215
The court then considered whether the error was harmless. On the
one hand, the trial offered ample evidence that could support such an
inference. "If the question before us were one of sufficiency of the evi-
dence, there is no doubt whatsoever that the evidence sufficed to demon-
strate constructive possession. '' 216 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit con-cluded that "[a] jury could infer that [the defendant] had both knowledge
209. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
210. This logical leap is precisely the analytical move the McFarlane court refused to make.
See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text. In McFarlane, the district court refused to tell the
jury that certain facts could not constitute power and intent because doing so would "provid[e] the
court's view as to what the evidence demonstrated" and require it to "decide whether a particular act
by itself constitutes intent to exercise control," but that this was the jury's job. United States v.
McFarlane, 491 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2007). Cf United States v. Morgan, 914 F,2d 272, 275 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding that jury instruction did not "direct a verdict" for the prosecution because it
instructed the jury as to both knowledge and intent).
211. Caudill, supra note 4, at 542.
212. Id at 563.
213. 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000).
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and intent to exercise dominion and control over [a gun] merely from its
presence in the bedroom that [the defendant] shared with [another per-
son].
2 17
On the other hand, however, "the evidence of ... [the defendant's]
knowledge and intent was [not] so overwhelming that no rational jury
would find otherwise.'218 Accordingly, the court remanded for a new
trial.
Consistent with Colonna, Walls holds that the location of the object
can support the requisite inferences for constructive possession. How-
ever, while those inferences may be justified in one case, it does not
mean they are justified in every case. Although there can never be a case
where the court finds constructive possession without evidence of
knowledge and access, not every situation where a defendant has knowl-
edge and access will establish an adequate nexus to support a finding of
constructive possession.
Thus, while knowledge and access may support an inference of con-
structive possession by a properly instructed jury, it does not follow that
in every case the jury must make that inference. In contrast to Jameson,
the Fourth Circuit reversed a conviction based on essentially the same
facts. In United States v. Blue,219 a police officer stopped an automobile
to investigate a seatbelt violation. 220 Defendant Herbert Blue was sitting
in the passenger seat, and as the officer approached the car, he saw
Blue's shoulder "dip as if ... [he] were reaching under the seat with his
right hand.",2 2 1 Then, during a consent search of the car, the officer found
a loaded .38 revolver under Blue's seat.222 Other than the officer's de-
scription of the shoulder dip and the fact that the gun was found under
his seat, no evidence linked Blue to the firearm, but he was still con-
victed for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
On appeal, Blue argued that the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish constructive possession.223 The Fourth Circuit agreed. It held that
"[t]hese facts alone do not justify a finding of constructive possession.
To uphold a finding of constructive possession, this court requires more
evidence of dominion and control than the government has offered
here., 2 2 4 The only connection was "mere proximity," which could not
establish constructive possession.225 Thus, "Blue's shoulder dip alone
217. Id
218. Id.
219. 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992).




224. Id. at 108.
225. Id.
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does not transform Blue from a mere passenger in the car to a possessor
of whatever is discovered underneath the seat in which he is sitting.
2 16
Although Blue's strikingly similar facts cast a cold shadow over
Jameson, the Blue court "emphasize[d] that the facts of this case fall
outside, but just barely, the realm of the quantum of evidence necessary
to support a finding of constructive possession., 227 How little, then, must
be added to support a finding of constructive possession? One might
conclude that Jameson crossed that line because the gun was not under
Jameson's seat but presumably under his foot. However, this fact only
goes to knowledge. It implies nothing as to any link between the person
and the gun.
More troubling is the observation in Jameson that the "inferred
physical contact with the pistol (his foot was on top of it)" 228 is really
nothing more than very close proximity. In one breath, the court writes
that "[p]roximity alone . . . is insufficient to establish knowledge and
access to ... a firearm in a joint occupancy case. 229 In the next breath,
however, it concludes the evidence, which other than the shoulder dip
was nothing more than proximity, was sufficient.
Either the gun was on the floor when Jameson got in the car, or he
put it on the floor before the officers searched the car. If it was the latter,
then we have a case of actual possession, and a constructive possession
instruction would not be appropriate.230  Although "a reasonable juror
could infer that Mr. Jameson had actual physical control of the pistol
when the car was pulled over and that he was trying to hide it underneath
the seat or under his foot, '231 one wonders whether the government
would ever have prosecuted such a case if it knew it would have to estab-
lish actual possession beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, if
the gun was already in the car, then the question for the jury was whether
such conduct-stepping on a gun that happens to be in the car where
someone is getting a ride-rises to the level of possession.
To avoid injustice, it is necessary to impose an intent requirement.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that a person sitting in a car knows if a
gun is literally under his foot, and in such circumstances, the person
226. Id; see also United States v. Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (rec-
ognizing that "a passenger may not be convicted unless there is evidence connecting him with the
contraband, other than his presence in the vehicle") (citations omitted).
227. Blue, 957 F.2d at 108.
228. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007).
229. Id. at 1209.
230. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 787-88 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that con-
structive possession was not warranted where the only evidence linking defendant to abandoned
firearm was witness's testimony that he thought he saw defendant put something where gun was
later found); United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 947-48 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that jury
could not have convicted on a constructive possession theory without accepting evidence that would
support proof of actual possession).
231. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1210.
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clearly has access to the gun. But knowledge and access should not be
enough to convict. Certainly the person has never taken actual posses-
sion, and if he lacks any intention to take possession of the item, then
§ 922(g) is in no way implicated. On the other hand, if the person is
mentally planning to use the gun at some point, then it seems reasonable
to say that the person is possessing the gun. This question, of course,
may be difficult to answer. But that difficulty does not mean that the
court should take the burden away and let the prosecution infer intent
from the mere fact of proximity. To the contrary, in the absence of evi-
dence to show the defendant intended to exercise dominion and control,
the government should not be allowed to prevail at trial.
By substituting knowledge and access for the nexus requirement,
the Tenth Circuit has rendered the requirement meaningless and makes
"virtually anyone in a joint occupancy situation liable for contraband
possessed by a co-inhabitant, ' 232 a situation squarely rejected in
Lucero.233 Consider a few examples.
1. An upstanding, law-abiding, professional parent is charged with
constructive possession of drugs she knows are in her wayward son's
unlocked bedroom.
2. A convicted felon is charged with possessing an expensive hunt-
ing rifle kept on display in his neighbor's living room where he is oc-
casionally invited over for dinner.
3. A convicted felon who knows that his neighbor keeps a gun in his
bedroom is given a key to his neighbor's house while the neighbor
goes out of town.
23 4
4. A convicted felon shopping for sporting goods for his son is
charged with constructively possessing ammunition he sees on
unlocked shelves in the store.
235
5. A convicted felon working for a construction company is charged
with constructively possessing a gun he discovers (but never touches)
in the closet of a room he is hired to remodel.
In each of these situations, the government could clearly establish
knowledge and access to the contraband. Hopefully, it is equally clear
that the doctrine of constructive possession should not extend to such
232. Petition for Certiorari at 7, United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
233. See supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
234. At oral argument in Ledford, the government conceded that under the court's instruction
there, this scenario would constitute constructive possession. See Rehearing Petition at 7, United
States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
235. Cf United States v. Francis, 462 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that employee of
a firearms store constructively possessed guns stored within its vault).
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situations.236 However, by substituting knowledge and access for the
nexus requirement, the Tenth Circuit has expanded liability to include
these situations. As defined by the Tenth Circuit, "the doctrine of con-
structive possession effectively imposes liability for being present at a
place where drugs are being used,, 237 and in the case of felons, it crini-
nalizes mere presence anywhere a gun is known to be found. Such broad
liability does not make sense.
III. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Only the Tenth Circuit can rectify this imbalance. Significantly,
constructive possession is a judicially-created doctrine.238 Although
Congress could certainly enact a constructive possession statute, it has
not done so. Thus, "judicial use of a general possession statute to assert
the broader liability usurps the legislature's proper function., 239  Re-
cently, the Tenth Circuit refused to infer a defense to possession that was
not established by § 922(g). 240 The court should likewise refrain from
expanding liability in a way that is not required by the statute. The stric-
tures of this doctrine fall exclusively within the domain of the court, and
it has full authority to expand or limit the doctrine as appropriate. Sev-
eral policy observations suggest that the court should limit, rather than
expand, the doctrine of constructive possession.
A. Firearm Possession Is Not Inherently a Crime
First, courts must remember that firearm possession is not inher-
ently a crime. Section 922(g) "criminalizes conduct that could otherwise
be lawful based upon the status of the person engaging in that con-
duct., 24 1 Indeed, the Constitution itself secures the right to "keep and
bear arms. 242  While scholars from all political stripes have argued
whether this creates a personal right to carry arms or merely guarantees
that states may assemble their own militias,243 the existence of such a
right certainly repudiates any sense that weapon possession is somehow
inherently wrong.
236. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Crimi-
nal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 908-09 (2001) ("[If one expansively defines posses-
sion to include constructive possession, the criminalization of possession presumptively criminalizes
everyone everywhere.").
237. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 765.
238. Id. at 761.
239. Id. at 765.
240. See United States v. Baker, No. 07-3002, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 28296, at *15 (10th Cir.
Dec. 6, 2007) (holding that court lacked authority to infer a "Good Samaritan" defense to § 922(g)
"when Congress could have created the defense had it seen fit to do so").
241. United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
243. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
831 (1998); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
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Moreover, while it is common knowledge that convicted felons
cannot possess firearms, many of the individuals prosecuted for firearms
possession do not realize beforehand that "a misdemeanor [domestic
violence] conviction can ban [them] from gun ownership for the rest of
[their lives]. Even for the deer hunt., 244 Other defendants may not real-
ize that their state misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty
greater than two years, disqualifies them from lawfully possessing a fire-
arm under federal law.245 Still others may not realize they are disquali-
fied by a state felony conviction that did not include the loss of civil
rights, despite statutory language that permits possession by defendants
whose lost civil rights are subsequently restored.246 For defendants who
did not even realize they could not lawfully possess a firearm, it adds
insult to injury to allow the government to convict them of possessing a
firearm they never touched or even intended to touch.247
Aside from any misunderstanding about the statutory scheme, con-
structive possession extends liability in a way that can be counterintuitive
to defendants. One client charged under § 922(g) admitted that he saw a
friend put a gun between the driver and passenger seat when my client
was a passenger in the friend's car. He could not understand how he
could be charged with possessing the firearm if he never touched the gun
or intended to touch the gun. Those who realize they are not allowed to
possess a firearm may conscientiously avoid touching a firearm only to
discover that they have constrictively possessed a weapon merely by
moving into a position where they have access to it. It may well be that
the facts of a case discredit a defendant's claim that he was near the gun
but had no intention of possessing it. However, the law must protect
those who are, in fact, innocent without fear that a known felon might
take possession of a gun he does not currently have and might then use it
to commit a violent crime.
244. Domestic Violence: Feds Can Take Away Violator's Gun-For Life, Ogden Standard
Examiner (Oct. 27, 2004).
245. 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(20)(B) (2008); Logan v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 475, 479 (2007)
("An offense classified by a State as a misdemeanor... may qualify... as a predicate for a felon-in-
possession conviction under § 922(g)[] only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in
prison."). On the flip side, some state felonies do not qualify as felonies for purpose of felon in
possession. United States v. Hill, No. 07-3034, 2008 WL 134207 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2008) (holding
that Kansas conviction was not a felony because defendant could never have received a sentence
greater than one year).
246. Logan, 128 S. Ct. at 479 (holding that "the § 921(a)(20) exemption provision [for one
whose rights are restored] does not cover the case of an offender who retained civil rights at all
times, and whose legal status, postconviction, remained in all respects unaltered by any state dispen-
sation").
247. Cf United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging
the possibility that "circumstances may arise where a defendant's ignorance of the law may consti-
tute a mitigating sentencing factor"); United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 965 n.31 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (stating that "ignorance of law may be considered by the court in mitigation of punishment").
But see United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951, 956 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting) (recognizing
that ignorance based on cultural differences may warrant a sentencing reduction but "that a defen-
dant who is or should be familiar with this country's laws and traditions may not invoke ignorance
... to obtain a reduced sentence").
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B. Federal Firearm Charges Carry Harsh Penalties
Second, it is important to remember that firearm cases in the federal
system frequently receive lengthy punishments. In general, a felon con-
victed of carrying a firearm faces a sentence of up to 10 years.248 How-
ever, firearm statutes are subject to severe mandatory minimum sen-
tences, ranging from five years to life.249 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), if
that gun was possessed "in furtherance of any [crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime]," the defendant is subject to a mandatory sentence of 5
or 25 years, in addition to any other sentence he might receive.
250
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)2 ' replaces the 10-year
maximum with a 15-year mandatory minimum for defendants with three
or more prior drug trafficking or violent felonies. 2  In contrast to
§ 924(c), which creates a separate crime for situations where guns are
linked with crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes, the ACCA is a
sentencing enhancement. Thus, the conduct at issue is identical to any
other firearm possession case-the only difference is the status of the
offender. Because such lengthy sentences can be grossly disproportion-
ate to a defendant's conduct, the courts should narrow rather than expand
liability under these provisions.253
C. Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion
In response to these concerns, one might argue that unjust convic-
tions and excessive sentences will be avoided by prosecutors who decide
what cases to bring. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit recently rejected a defen-
dant's attempt to impose an intent requirement on actual possession, rea-
soning in part that "if the safeguard against liability ... is not provided
by the statute, it is found in the exercise of sound prosecutorial discre-
tion., 254 Unfortunately, prosecutorial discretion may not prevent prose-
cutions in the situations described above, and it certainly does not pre-
248. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (2008).
249. Bernard Harcourt, Introduction: Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 43 ARIZ. L.
REv. 261, 261 (2001).
250. It is not uncommon for § 924(c) prosecutions to be based on constructive possession
theories. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cit. 2006) (reversing § 924(c)
conviction because government failed to establish a positive link between the defendant and the
charged weapons). In United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006), which has received
wide publicity for the 55-year sentence handed down to a first-time convict, 25 years of the sentence
are attributable to a constructive possession charge. Id. at 754.
251. § 924(e).
252. Id.
253. Cf Ruiz, 462 F.3d at 1089 (citing "the mandatory nature of the sentence imposed for a
violation of § 924(c)" in support of its finding that the government had not established constructive
possession).
254. United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d 1321, 1327 (10th Cir. 2007).
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vent prosecutions where the punishment grossly outweighs the crime. 255
A number of factors may account for this.
For one thing, because the ACCA is a sentencing enhancement, a
prosecutor may not realize at the time of the indictment that a simple
possession charge will result in a mandatory 15-year sentence. The
ACCA is triggered by a defendant's prior criminal record, and it is well
settled that this prior record need not be charged in the indictment or
found by a jury.256 Thus, it is possible for the prosecutor to learn from a
Pre-Sentencing Report (PSR) that a particular defendant faces a 15-year
mandatory minimum sentence. By this time, it will typically be too late
for a defendant to try to avoid the harsh mandatory minimum by having a
trial.257
Still, a prosecutor who knows that a defendant faces a 15-year man-
datory minimum may be obligated to press charges anyway, despite the
fact that such a sentence would be grossly disproportional to the charged
conduct. In 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted a charging
policy memorandum that required federal prosecutors to "charge and
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are
supported by the facts of the case," subject to a handful of exceptions.258
Under this policy, "[t]he most serious offense or offenses are those that
255. See, e.g., id. (upholding conviction and resulting 235-month sentence of a convicted felon
who picked up abandoned ammunition to prevent trick-or-treaters from getting it and had it in his
possession for only 10 minutes while he tried to take it to the police); Angelos, 433 F.3d 754 (10th
Cir. 2006) (affirming 55-year sentence for firearms possession in connection with drug trafficking);
United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1243-47 (D. Utah 2004) (comparing 55-year sen-
tence for firearms possession in connection with drug trafficking with significantly lighter penalties
for more serious crimes); United States v. Pikyavit, No. 2106-CR-407 (D. Utah Apr. 26, 2007)
(imposing mandatory 15-year sentence for Native American defendant who lived in deceased par-
ents' home where bullets had been left by family members after years of deer hunting). I repre-
sented Pkyavit at trial.
256. See, e.g., Baker, 508 F.3d at 1327-30.
257. Although some would argue that a defendant should be aware of what prior convictions he
has that might trigger a mandatory minimum under the ACCA, the definitions for crimes of violence
and drug trafficking offenses are very technical and have been the source of much litigation at all
levels. This Term alone, the United States Supreme Court has already heard three cases arguing
technical aspects of the ACCA. See Logan v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 475, 479 (2007) ("An offense
classified by a State as a misdemeanor ... may qualify ... as a predicate for a felon-in-possession
conviction under § 922(g)[] only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in prison.");
United States v. Rodriguez (06-1646) (asking whether a prior state conviction that carried a higher
penalty under a separate rescidivist statute qualified defendant for an enhanced penalty under
ACCA); United States v. Begay, (06-1153) (asking whether a prior conviction for felony driving
under the influence of alcohol was a crime of violence under ACCA). Thus, it is unreasonable to
expect an untrained defendant to understand the full ramifications of his criminal record, and crimi-
nal records provided to counsel in discovery are sometimes incomplete. One way to avoid discover-
ing that a defendant qualifies for ACCA enhancement only after he has already pleaded guilty is to
rely on a pre-plea PSR. Anecdotally, it appears that pre-plea PSRs are common practice in some
districts but infrequent in others.
258. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to all Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. The memoran-
dum further defined when a charge is "readily provable." A "charge is not 'readily provable' if the
prosecutor has a good faith doubt, for legal or evidentiary reasons, as to the Government's ability
readily to prove a charge at trial." Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
generate the most substantial sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines,
unless a mandatory minimum sentence or count requiring a consecutive
sentence would generate a longer sentence. 25 9  Although "charges
should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea," the policy
constricted productive plea discussions because "[o]nce filed, the most
serious readily provable charges may not [generally] be dismissed.,
260
Under this policy, a line prosecutor may be obligated to bring the "read-
ily provable" charges discussed above and prohibited from dismissing
such charges in a plea agreement.
Finally, an expansive doctrine lends itself to misuse of prosecutorial
discretion because it "creates a system of selective law enforcement.,
261
Professor Whitebread writes:
The primary utility of the doctrine arises in the group arrest context.
In a situation where the police arrest several people in one apartment
but cannot show actual possession by any one of them, the doctrine
allows the prosecutor to select those whom he will charge and those
whom he will not. Such choices are neither uniform nor consistent.
They are either based on the irrelevant fact of ownership of the prem-
ises or the fortuitous circumstance of proximity, or they flow from
the prosecutor's attitude toward drug users and the particular drug.262
Or, as seen here, they flow from the prosecutor's attitude towards fire-
arms.
263
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that prosecutorial discretion will effec-
tively prevent the injustices described here.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of these considerations, three recommendations are in order:
(1) Require proof of intent in constructive possession cases; (2) Further
develop the nexus requirement and correct the unfair practice of replac-
ing the nexus requirement with proof of knowledge and access; and (3)
Recognize that a person's intent regarding the weapon may be a mitigat-
ing factor not accounted for by the Guidelines.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 765.
262. Id. at 765-766.
263. In a training for state law enforcement officers, one federal prosecutor asked the officers
to "get their domestic violence cases with guns moved from state court to federal court, where the
sentence can be prison instead of jail time." Domestic Violence, supra note 244. He said, "We want
more of these cases. We're not getting enough. Do it because it's fun. It's fun to send these guys to
prison. Sentences in federal prison are listed in months. When you say 84 months, these ... guys
throw up. I love it. It scares them." Id.
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A. Require Proof of Intent
The first recommendation is for courts to require proof of intent in
constructive possession cases. This recommendation applies first in the
district court. Although the Tenth Circuit indicated in Jameson that in-
tent is not required, in United States v. Zink it specifically affirmed a
constructive possession instruction that included an intent requirement:
"A person who although not in actual possession knowingly has both the
power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control
over a thing either directly or indirectly or through another person or
persons is then in constructive possession of it.''264 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit called this a "stock instruction on this issue which has been af-
firmed many times.' 265 As recently as 2004, the court has affirmed the
266use of this instruction. Thus, district courts should exercise their dis-
cretion at sentencing by requiring evidence of intent in constructive pos-
session cases.267
In the end, however, it is not enough that district judges have discre-
tion to give such an instruction. Until they are required to give such an
instruction, there will be no sure protection for individuals who cross
paths with some contraband. Thus, it is up to the Tenth Circuit to join
every other circuit in the country and recognize that constructive posses-
sion requires proof of a defendant's intention to exercise control or do-
minion over the object.268
264. United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 516 n. I (10th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
265. ld. at 516.
266. United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
267. One puzzle for defendants who claim they never intended to exercise dominion or control
over a gun is whether they should assert their theory of the case at trial or simply plead guilty. On
the one hand, they would like to tell the jury that they never intended to touch the gun. However, a
defendant who goes to trial loses the benefit of a guideline reduction for pleading guilty. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1. 1(2003). To then get to that point only to have the dis-
trict court deny an intent instruction, knowing that the Tenth Circuit will affirm, adds insult to injury.
Where a district court judge is inclined to refuse an intent instruction, one approach may allow
defendants to preserve the legal issue for appeal while also receiving the reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. In contrast to the usual practice of arguing jury instructions on the eve of trial, de-
fense counsel might file a motion with the court prior to the motion cutoff, requesting a specific jury
instruction on constructive possession. If the district court agrees to give an intent instruction, the
defendant may decide to give up the reduction for accepting responsibility in exchange for the
chance to tell his side of the story. If the district court denies such a motion, the defendant may ask
to enter a conditional plea, preserving the issue for appeal. If this request is denied, a trial under-
taken only to preserve a legal issue for appeal should not disqualify him from the reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines make clear that "[c]onviction by trial, however, does
not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction" where a defendant
"challenge[s] ... the applicability of a statute to his conduct." Id. at cmt. n.2. Under such circum-
stances, a defendant may do well to stipulate to knowledge and access and point out that because he
did not intend to possess the gun, the statute does not apply to him. Because the crux of the jury
instruction request and the resultant trial would be simply to preserve the argument that the statute
did not apply to his conduct, he should receive acceptance.
268. Because a Tenth Circuit panel has expressly rejected any intent requirement, this may be
done only by the en banc court. United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000). In the
Tenth Circuit, this can happen in a variety of ways. The most well-known way is to seek rehearing
en banc following an adverse ruling. Id. Litigants should also be aware that a Tenth Circuit panel
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Consistent with such a holding, the court should also modify its pat-
tern jury instructions to require a showing of intent. One easy solution
would be to simply add intent language to the current instruction as fol-
lows: "A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has
[both] the power [and the intention] at a given time to exercise dominion
or control over an object, either directly or through another person or
persons, is then in constructive possession of it."
269
B. Proof' Enforce Nexus Requirement
As discussed above, Ledford and Jameson weakened the nexus re-
quirement by equating it with knowledge and access. 270 Thus, the second
recommendation is that courts give greater content to the nexus require-
ment. This recommendation can be done in two ways.
First, whatever else a nexus might entail, courts should recognize
that there is no nexus unless the defendant intends to exercise dominion
or control over the object. One way to do this might be to modify the
pattern jury instructions as follows:
In the situation where the object is found in a place (such as a room
or car) occupied by more than one person, you may not infer control
over the object based solely on joint occupancy. Mere control over
the place in which the object is found is not sufficient to establish
constructive possession. Instead, in this situation the government
must prove some connection between the particular defendant and
the object. As part of this connection, the government must prove
that the defendant knowingly had the power and the intention to ex-
ercise dominion or control over the object.
271
The Ninth Circuit has required both a nexus and evidence of intent:
To prove constructive possession, the government must prove a suf-
ficient connection between the defendant and the contraband to sup-
port the inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control
over the firearms. In the more difficult situation where the premises
are shared by more than one person, the Ninth Circuit has found that
if a party has knowledge of the weapon and both the power and the
intention to exercise dominion and control over it, then he has con-
structive possession. Mere proximity to contraband, presence on
"may overrule a point of law established by a prior panel after obtaining authorization from all active
judges on the court." Id. at 721. This is often done through an "en banc footnote," a footnote stating
that the opinion has been circulated to all active judges on the court and that all judges agree the
prior opinion should be overturned. See, e.g., United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1105 n.6
(10th Cir. 2007).
269. See TENTH CIRCUIT PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 1.31 (2006). With the
inserted language, this instruction is identical to the version initially proposed in the Tenth Circuit.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 133-68 and accompanying text.
271. See TENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 1.31 (italicized language
added).
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property where it is found and association with a person or persons
having control of it are all insufficient to establish constructive pos-
session.
272
In addition to clarifying legal standards for this nexus, courts must
take this nexus requirement more seriously in future cases. District
courts should enter judgments of acquittal, and the Tenth Circuit should
reverse convictions where the connection is as tenuous as it was in
Jameson and Blue. Allowing such convictions to stand repudiates the
longstanding principle that mere proximity is not enough to convict.
C. Sentencing: Recognize Mitigating Value of Intent
Finally, courts should recognize that a defendant's intent regarding
the firearm may justify a sentence below the applicable guideline range.
A defendant's intent with regard to the charged firearm is highly relevant
to assessing an appropriate sentence. 273 For example, a constructive pos-
session defendant in the Tenth Circuit who never intended even to touch
the gun should be punished less severely than a gang member who was
heading to a drug deal with a gun tucked into his waistband.
The Guidelines reflect the relevance of intent by imposing a 4-level
increase where the defendant "possessed... any firearm.., with knowl-
edge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in
connection with another felony offense., 274 On the flip side, the Guide-
lines provide a 6-level decrease where the weapons were possessed for
sporting purposes only.275
However, this reduction may not be broad enough in two regards.
First, while the sporting use rationale presumably applies to all defen-
dants, the decrease does not. Certain defendants-primarily those with
longer criminal records-cannot receive this reduction.276 Second, the
Guidelines do not include a decrease for defendants whose intent regard-
ing the gun may be otherwise provably harmless. 277 This aspect of the
current Guidelines is particularly problematic in the Tenth Circuit where
a defendant may not have intended to touch the gun at all. Of course,
many defendants who try to make such a claim will understandably have
272. United States v. Carrasco, 257 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 449 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing
how defendant's manifest purposes regarding the rifle he possessed impacted the severity of his
sentence and noting that "[o]ne can have a purpose for possessing a firearm before actually using the
firearm for that purpose").
274. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2007).
275. USSG § 2K2. (b)(2).
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that mandatory
application of the Guidelines was not plain error in ACCA case where defendant helped his girl-
friend buy a gun for personal protection, showed her how to shoot the gun, and taught her how to
clean it).
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proof problems. But the burden is theirs,278 and a defendant who can
credibly claim that he did not intend to possess the charged firearm
should receive a lower sentence.
Fortunately, the Guidelines themselves acknowledge that a district
court is authorized to impose a sentence below the guideline range if a
mitigating factor that was "not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines ... should result
in a sentence different from that described., 279 The Guidelines continue:
"A departure may be warranted in an exceptional case, even though the
circumstance that forms the basis for the departure is taken into consid-
eration in determining the guideline range, if the court determines that
such circumstance is present in the offense to a degree substantially in
excess of, or substantially below, that which ordinarily is involved in that
kind of offense. 280 Ordinarily, a defendant guilty of knowingly possess-
ing a firearm intended to possess the weapon. Thus, a defendant who
pleads guilty to possessing a weapon he never intended to touch seems to
fall within the category whose offense is substantially below the ordinary
level.
For other defendants who intended to possess the firearm for sport-
ing purposes but are disqualified based on their prior criminal record, a
nonguideline sentence may still be appropriate. One district court re-
cently noted that sporting use "is something that the Guidelines take into
account in other areas, but for some reason do not take into account in
this particular area [where the defendant's prior record disqualifies him
from the reduction.], 28' The court relied on this fact among other miti-
gating facts as ground for imposing a nonguideline sentence.282 In similar
fashion, the Tenth Circuit should recognize that where the Guidelines do
not adequately reflect a defendant's intent regarding the weapon, a sen-
tence below the guideline range is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
None of these recommendations marks a drastic expansion of the
law. As discussed above, the Tenth Circuit has already recognized that a
district court may properly instruct a jury that constructive possession
requires proof of intent to exercise control or dominion, and it is well
established that the government must show a nexus to establish its case.
But for defendants like Ben Cecala, Chrisopher Jameson, or any other
278. Cf Sanders, 449 F.3d at 1090 (stating that defendant has the burden of proving that he
qualifies for a sporting use reduction).
279. USSG § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A).
280. USSG §5K2.0(a)(3).
281. United States v. Pikyavit, No. 2:06-CR-407, at 24.
282. Id. (imposing nonguideline sentence based on (1) the fact that defendant possessed only
bullets, (2) the fact that the bullets were used only by others for sporting purposes, and (3) the evi-
dence in the case was discovered as a result of the defendant's request that police investigate an
assault where he was a victim).
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innocent bystanders who happen to find themselves in the presence of
contraband, these protections are necessary to avoid liability for "mere
proximity" to the contraband.
As seen here, the Tenth Circuit has unfairly expanded the doctrine
of constructive possession. Although its recent cases continue to pro-
claim that "mere proximity" is not enough to establish possession and
that a "nexus" is required between the defendant and a firearm,28 3 its
holdings invalidate these proclamations. By transforming the sufficiency
of "knowledge and access" into the touchstone of constructive posses-
sion, the Tenth Circuit has eliminated the nexus requirement and broad-
ened the possession to include many situations where individuals would
never have touched the object in question. It has defined "possession" in
such a way that even a person who is conscientiously trying to live
within the limits of the law may unwittingly "possess" an item just by
discovering he has access to it. Such breadth is untenable.284 The Tenth
Circuit should join its sister circuits and recognize that possession turns
on "the possessor's manifested intent to exercise such control over the
object" 285 and require proof of intent to possess in constructive posses-
sion cases. It should also conscientiously enforce the nexus requirement
and recognize that in the world of harsh federal firearm sentences, a de-
fendant's intent may be the basis for a reduced sentence.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229, 1257 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Mendez, No. 06-3282 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 2008).
284. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897)
(stating that the law must enable even a "bad man" to "predict" the "material consequences" of his
conduct, i.e., whether his conduct is legal or not).
285. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 759.
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